The
Showtime Islands
James E. Mason
Smarter Policies
James E. Mason
Smarter Policies
September
11, 2015
China’s reclamation of land and the formation of outposts
in the South China Sea is an odd mixture of domestic politics and military
folly. Simply put, they cannot be defended and China lacks effective expedition
capabilities needed for any adventures in the region. The purpose of the entire
island building venture is political leverage. Nothing more. Alarmist media
coverage in both countries ensures this.
The island building campaign has the quest for natural
resources as its reason for existence and this sounds logical. Where the logic
breaks down is in logistics. The distances that need to be covered are vast. If
there was not an issue of territorial waters (Philippines, Vietnam etc.) and a
simple matter of exploiting and transporting resources then the entire endeavor
would be sound. This is not a perfect world. The islands will have to have a
complex logistics chain in order to be profitable. The Chinese Navy (PLAN) is
not a “Blue Water” navy like that of the US. The greatest threat they can pose
in those waters comes from their submarine fleet, a fleet made up predominantly
of aging Soviet designs that the U.S. already knows how to track and kill.
There is only one carrier in their inventory and it is still a work in
progress. Even if the carrier was in full operation it is sole source of sea
based air power, for an entire navy.
As work progresses on the islands it becomes clear that
China wants to use them as early warning pickets as well as outposts. The
islands are far enough from the mainland to provide warning of an attack or to
simply monitoring an enemy. Over the horizon radar and other communications
equipment are being installed. There is speculation that the communication
equipment could be used to help target the D-21 anti-ship ballistic missile
(the “Carrier Killer”) and therefore give the Chinese a deterrent. There is
still one flaw that undermines this strategy.
Islands do not, move. Stealth can defeat radar and the U.S. has decades of experience in implementing stealth technology. There has been much criticism regarding the U.S. military’s and, the air force in particular, reliance on the strategy of overwhelming air power as it was used in the 1991 Gulf War. Many call for the strategy to be scrapped because we will not always need it in the rapidly changing world. That is true. What is also true is that these islands present the same situation that enable the Desert Storm strategy to work. A key component to this doctrine is the destruction/disruption of communications, command and control (C3). This worked well in the deserts of Iraq and the distances involved with the Chinese bases are even greater.
Islands do not, move. Stealth can defeat radar and the U.S. has decades of experience in implementing stealth technology. There has been much criticism regarding the U.S. military’s and, the air force in particular, reliance on the strategy of overwhelming air power as it was used in the 1991 Gulf War. Many call for the strategy to be scrapped because we will not always need it in the rapidly changing world. That is true. What is also true is that these islands present the same situation that enable the Desert Storm strategy to work. A key component to this doctrine is the destruction/disruption of communications, command and control (C3). This worked well in the deserts of Iraq and the distances involved with the Chinese bases are even greater.
With all of the factors at play one has to wonder what
the endgame is for these outposts. It is too soon to have any hope that they
would provide a military use. The Chinese military is still in the midst of
massive modernization. Politically they are more useful for internal propaganda
than they are for international leverage. The only possible explanation is they
are part of a long range plan. If so, is making noise about them advantageous
at this point in time?
Only China knows.
Only China knows.